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TIGER TALK: WHAT IS THE ACADEMY SAYING AND WHY? 
The Celtic Tiger was first identified in 1994 in a report by economic consultants Morgan 
Stanley.  The Tiger was well established between 1995 and 2000 when the Irish economy 
expanded at an average annual rate of 9.4%.  This was the period when the Irish Academy of 
Management (IAM) was formed with the first conference being held in 1997.  After 2000, the 
Irish economy continued to grow at an average annual rate of almost 6% up until 2008 when 
everything changed utterly.  The property bubble burst, banking debt was appropriated by the 
Irish state, which was then bailed out by international institutions. There was also a 
concomitant drop in GDP, a massive rise in unemployment, large reductions in state 
expenditure allied to a range of measures to increase state income.  The question that this 
paper addresses is, ‘What has the academy, and the IAM in particular, had to say about these 
phenomena – the Celtic Tiger, the property bubble and the financial implosion – which were 
all unprecedented in Irish history?’.   
The proceedings of the IAM annual conference provide the primary empirical material used 
to address this question.  In due course, it is hoped that the proceedings of other sister 
academic groupings, such as the Irish Accounting and Finance Association, will provide 
another dataset, as well as publications by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
and the Irish Economic Association (specifically the Economic and Social Review), and wider 
publications related to Irish business.  Together, these texts provide an important part of the 
commentary on (and explanation of) the world of practice during and after the Celtic Tiger.  
They are, in short, what we might refer to as ‘Tiger Talk’.   
The paper begins by presenting the initial findings of the review of the proceedings.  In brief, 
the study indicates that papers presented at IAM conferences have had little to say about the 
Celtic Tiger’s rise or fall.   The next section inquires into various explanations as to why this 
might be.  The paper then concludes with some speculations on how things might or should 
change in the future. 
The Irish Academy of Management, 2004-2012 
Conference proceedings from the IAM annual conference were sourced from the conference 
organisers and the Irish Academy of Management.   Proceedings from 2004 to 2012 were 
located, though only the paper titles were available for 2007 and 2010.   The available dataset 
consulted is summarized in Table 1 below: 
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Year Location Papers Dataset 
1996 UCC 39 Full papers (hard copy) 
1997 DCU     
1998       
1999       
2000 DIT 99 Full papers (hard copy) 
2001       
2002 WIT     
2003 UCD     
2004 TCD 240 Full papers 
2005 GMIT 199 Full papers 
2006 UCC 164 Full papers 
2007 QUB 172 Paper titles  
2008 DCU 157 Full papers 
2009 GMIT 155 Full papers 
2010 CIT 119 Paper titles  (hard copy) 
2011 NCI 93 Full papers 
2012 NUIM 106 Full papers 
Total since 2004 1405   
Table 1.  Irish Academy of Management Papers Archive 
The analysis of the annual proceedings was focused on identifying those papers that were 
explicitly concerned with issues clearly associated with the Celtic Tiger and its aftermath.  
There is obviously a judgement to be made here in terms of the strength of the association, 
and therefore, for the purpose of transparency, the titles of those papers that explicitly 
analysed either the Celtic Tiger or its aftermath are listed in Table 2.1  Papers were not 
included if they merely referred to the Celtic Tiger as part of the context of their study. 
Year Title Author(s) 
2011 The case of AIB and ICI 1985-1994: the measurement 
and disclosure of a liability 
Cotter, D. 
2010 Irish Banking: A comparative analysis of Canadian 
and Irish bank lending practices 
Kennedy, J. & Mackenzie, C. 
 The impact of the global financial crisis on Human 
Resource Management: Evidence from the 
multinational sector in a highly globalized economy. 
Gunnigle, P., Lavelle, J. & Monaghan, S. 
2009 Principles-based regulation: The implications for 
financial services management in Ireland 
Brosnan, M., Mullins, M. 
2007 Why has Irish social partnership survived? Donaghey, J. & Teague, P. 
2005 Those the ‘Celtic Tiger’ have forgotten: labour 
relations practices and migrant workers in Ireland. 
Gonzalez-Perez, M-A., McDonough, T. & 
Dundon, T. 
 Is following the path of the Celtic Tiger an option for 
the Latin American countries? 
Rios-Morales, R. 
Table 2.  IAM papers focused on the Celtic Tiger 
                                                
1 I presented papers at the 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 IAM conferences. None of these papers related to 
the Celtic Tiger.   
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When the decision criteria are widened somewhat, to include papers that have Ireland as a distinctive 
part of their study – though these papers tend not to be analysing the Celtic Tiger – then we find an 
additional twelve papers, which are listed in Table 3.  Papers that studied, say, the Irish hospitality 
sector, without dealing with some aspect of the Celtic Tiger, were not included. 
Year Title Author(s) 
2012 Transformation & resurgence? Conceptualising 
industrial relations conflict in a changed context. 
Cowman, J. & Keating, M. 
2010 Emerging from the recession: A 6th era for marketing Allen, F. et al 
2009 Corporate governance and the decision to use 
derivatives:  evidence from Irish firms. 
Carroll, A., Ryan, J., Whelan, K. 
 The influence of the newspaper media on the corporate 
governance practices of Irish listed PLCs 
Gorman, L., Lynn, T., Mulgrew, M. 
 Union organising; challenges and strategies. Murphy, C. (postgraduate track) 
 On the Entrepreneurship Policy Discourse in 
Ireland: Between Incentives for Success and 
Remedies for Failure 
McCarthy, P. 
2008 Whistleblowing – the case of a large Irish financial 
services company 
Buckley, C., Cotter, D. & Hutchinson, M. 
2006 Corporate Governance Characteristics and the Extent 
of Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland.  
Donnelly, R., Mulcahy, M. & Zhan, Q. 
 Is There a Representation Gap in the New Irish 
Economy? An Examination of Recent Union Density 
Levels and Employee Attitudes to Trade Unions. 
Turner, T., D’Art, D. & O’Sullivan, M. 
2005 Multinationals in Ireland - who are they?  A 
methodological critique 
McDonnell, A., Lavell, J., Collings, D. & 
Gunnigle, P. 
 Irish workers perceptions of the impact of immigrants: 
A cause for concern? 
Cross, C. & Turner, T. 
 Competitive advantage and diversity integration in 
Ireland 
Connolly, P. & McGing, G. 
Table 3.  IAM papers where the Celtic Tiger provides the context. 
What is clear from this analysis is that the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger was of very 
marginal concern in the IAM conferences, given that Table 2 lists only 7 of 1405 papers, or 
less than 0.5% of the total. The overwhelming sense is that the annual IAM conference, based 
on the collective presentations, is rather indifferent to what is happening in the Irish economy.  
Indeed the more recent proceedings give little indication of the turmoil that the economy 
experienced since 2008, much less an analysis of its causes.  And if there is a marked 
difference between the economy in 2012 compared to 2004, one would find it hard to divine 
this by examining what the members of IAM have been saying at annual conferences over 
this period.  It is also telling that the 2013 conference has no business ethics stream, even 
though there are significant and obvious ethical issues pertaining to the Celtic Tiger’s rise and 
fall.  Thus, the salient question is, ‘Why this apparent indifference?’ It is to this question that 
we now turn. 
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Explaining the indifference 
One possible explanation is that the issues are macro-economic and sociological in nature and 
are hence beyond the focus and competence of management academics.  Indeed economists 
and sociologists have consistently studied the Tiger and its downfall.  For instance, the ESRI 
produced a collection of papers in 2000 that analysed the Celtic Tiger in some depth, noting 
that the boom had not created more equality (Nolan et al. 2000).  More recently, economists 
have published a range of studies on the financial and property collapse in Ireland (Honohan 
2009a; b; Duffy 2010; Gurdgiev et al. 2011; Lane 2011; Connor et al. 2012).  Irish 
sociologists have also made substantive contributions to recent edited collections comparing 
Ireland and Greece (Leonard et al. 2011) and Ireland and Denmark (Böss 2010), while a 
number of edited collections on the Celtic Tiger and its collapse have also been published 
(Kirby 2002; Corcoran and Peillon 2006; Kirby 2010; Share and Corcoran 2010).  However, 
the fact that economists and sociologists are writing about the phenomenon does not seem to 
be a good reason why management academics should not.  After all, the Tiger’s rise and fall 
came about through the actions of individuals (especially managers), groups and 
organisations, albeit in an economic and social milieu. For instance, the recent publication of 
telephone conversations of managers in Anglo-Irish Bank provides a real insight into the 
workaday world of executives that is infused by hubris, mimesis, self-aggrandisement, 
jealousy, anxiety, reckless risk-taking and greed.  And it appears that what happened in the 
Irish banking sector was a classic case of phenomena routinely inquired into by management 
academics: poor corporate governance, where the personal ambitions of management were 
given free rein, where organisational culture celebrated risk-taking and denigrated regulation 
and bureaucracy, where crowds became ‘mad’, and where organisations and individuals 
feverishly and slavishly copied the actions of those popularly perceived to be successful.  
From this perspective, has Ireland provided a unique setting to inquire into management and 
organisational practice in a society and economy that was moving from pre-modernism to 
post-modernism, experimenting with de-regulated financial services, working through new 
forms of social partnership, and subsequently becoming a social and economic laboratory for 
austerity.  
A better explanation for the disinterest is probably to be found in the ‘habitus’ – i.e. the values, 
habits, daily practices, dispositions, and expectations (Bourdieu 1990) – of management 
academics.  Somewhat different value systems operate within management academia, so I 
will briefly discuss how each of these have worked to make the Celtic Tiger a turn-off for 
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management academics.     
First we have the values of positivism.  While the positivist tradition goes at least as far back 
as Comte in the 1830s, its influence on management academics is probably better traced to the 
1950s when the prototypical business school at Carnegie’s Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration (home to Simon, March et al) was doing foundational research on 
management and organisations.  In the tradition of mathematical sociology, the central idea 
was to create mathematical models of organisational and social phenomena that could, ideally, 
be simulated on a computer.  Crucially, history and context are sidelined, if not excised, in 
this approach.   What matters is producing general (i.e. theoretical) models of a social or 
organisational phenomenon akin to the type of models found in engineering and 
thermodynamics.   Losing context is not always a problem, especially if one is content to 
model within a defined jurisdiction such as the United States, but it is certainly a profound 
difficulty if one wants to study a specific phenomenon such as the Celtic Tiger, which is 
situated historically, legally, culturally and geographically.  And even if few Irish 
management academics might classify themselves as positivists, the values of the habitus are 
very much the values of positivism, as evidenced by the types of papers that are published in 
the higher-ranked management journals.  In short, history doesn’t matter very much, nor does 
geography, nor national culture, nor the particular legal jurisdiction.  In the habitus of 
management academics, local situated studies have low value, other than as case studies of 
some more general phenomenon.  
When history and context are unimportant, a curious understanding of temporality develops, 
which we might call presentness. ‘Now’ is all there is, which explains why the IAM 
proceedings of 2004 are more or less indistinguishable from 2012.  The objective in 
positivism is to produce general truths about the world, not truths that are specific to a 
particular time and place.  This value system is also visible in the temporal frame within 
which management academics operate, which is perhaps most obvious in the typical 
publishing timeline.  For instance, just before writing these lines I answered a phone call from 
a colleague with whom I am organising a conference in 2014.   He reported that he had 
spoken to the editor of a marketing journal that we were considering as a possible outlet for 
the conference papers and was told that the earliest special issue would be 2018!   More 
generally, it commonly takes a long time for papers to progress through the revise and 
resubmit process, which means that the final paper appears many years after the author first 
had the idea.  In that context it is perhaps no surprise that management academics did not 
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research the Celtic Tiger, knowing that their work might already be out-of-date on publication.   
Neither has interpretivism, the grand alternative to positivism, provided an epistemological 
basis for studying the Celtic Tiger, based on the papers presented at the annual conferences of 
the IAM.  This is partly because many if not most papers published in the interpretivist 
tradition still hold firm to much of positivism’s value system, in particular its privileging of 
presentness.  It may also be because interpretivism has traditionally favoured the analysis of 
qualitative rather than quantitative data, to the point of downright hostility to the latter.  But, 
an aversion to numbers makes it more than difficult to analyse or argue about property 
bubbles, economic meltdowns and the like, which may be why the interpretivists have 
ignored these phenomena. 
Moving towards left-field, one might have thought that the critical management studies 
(CMS) tradition might have had something to say about the Celtic Tiger and its demise.  But 
this is not the case.   Perhaps this is because ‘critters’ – as members of the CMS sub-tribe are 
sometimes known – are too busy institutionalising CMS within business schools where they 
must conform to the value system of the habitus (quite successfully, in many cases, as 
Rowlinson and Hassard (2011) highlight).  Indeed, the appropriation of the term ‘critical’ by 
CMS might have had an unintended consequence in lessening the requirement on 
‘mainstream’ management academics to have a critical edge to their work.  Similar to the way 
‘quality’ departments came to be dismantled in organisations on the basis that quality should 
be seen as everyone’s responsibility, there is a strong argument that CMS should also be let 
wither away, because the institutionalization of CMS as a sub-field is actually making 
mainstream management studies less rather than more critical. 
Relevance, provides another possible explanation for the lack of interest of management 
academics in the Celtic Tiger.   Making academic theory relevant to practice is a common 
mantra within academia, especially by those most closely associated with business practice.  
The belief in the need for relevance is evident in the UK’s Research Excellence Framework 
which now seeks to measure the impact of research.  It is also evident in the important 
distinction between Mode 1 and Mode 2 research (Huff and Huff 2001), with the former 
concerned with discipline-based scientific research (the byword being rigour) and the latter 
concerned with solving the problems of business and serving the needs of agencies that fund 
research (the byword being relevance). However, the unintended consequence of the pursuit 
of relevance is that management academics have actually become less relevant.  This is 
because the notion of being relevant is problematic in the context of business, which is 
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essentially a game with winners and losers (between and within organisations). Unlike 
medicine, where a scientific discovery can benefit everyone, the output of business research 
will only be relevant if some, but not all, businesses make use of the research (because there 
will be no competitive advantage if everyone applies the research findings).  This 
problematizes the ideology of relevance, given that management research done in publicly 
funded universities is typically made public.  Moreover, the institutional pressures on 
academics to theorize (i.e. generalize) also works against the notion of relevance (which, of 
necessity, must parochialise the findings).  Obfuscation then becomes a handy device to deal 
with these conflicting demands. 
Another possible explanation is that the disinterest displayed by management academics in 
analyzing the Celtic Tiger merely reflected the wider discourse.  To examine this a bit further 
I did a content analysis of Irish newspapers from 2000 to 2010, counting instances of the 
terms ‘property bubble’ or ‘housing bubble’.  Three datasets were searched: ‘The Irish Times 
Historical’ (in Proquest), ‘Irish Newspapers’ (in Proquest), and The Irish Times archive.   The 
results are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Count of ‘property bubble’ or ‘housing bubble’ in Irish print media 
The low count up to 2007 made it possible to review all articles up to that year, which showed 
that the vast majority of the articles up to 2007 were about property or housing bubbles 
outside of Ireland.  The few exceptions are worth highlighting.  In March 2003, Cliff Taylor, 
business editor of the Irish times, wrote an article about a Goodbody Stockbrokers report 
stating that the Irish housing market was entering ‘bubble territory’ (see The Irish Times, 26 
March 2003, p. 18).  In the same year, The Economist predicted that Irish property prices 
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would fall by 20 per cent in four years.  In 2004, Taylor presented another analysis of the 
housing market in which he more or less accepted that a ‘bubble’ exists, but that Ireland was 
different because ‘Here, there is no clear pin on the horizon to burst the bubble’ (The Irish 
Times, 16 July 2004, p. A5).  Similarly, an anonymous piece titled ‘The good times are here 
to stay’, stated: 
Despite all the doom and gloom warnings of the Central Bank and The Economist 
magazine amongst others, there is no sign of the Irish property ‘bubble’ bursting any time 
soon, according to the results of a property survey by Ken O’Brien’s specialist monthly 
journal Finance.  The survey, based on the views of a panel of leading economists, predicts 
an average growth of 4.6 per cent per annum over the next five years – at a rate of 9 per 
cent this year, followed by four years or more moderate growth’ (The Irish Times, 10 June 
2004, p. A6).   
In November 2005, the economics editor of The Economist, Pam Woodall, admitted that her 
2003 prediction of a property crash was wrong, but that the property crash would still happen 
in Ireland:  
“This is the biggest financial bubble in history, due to unsustainable low interest rates and 
at some time it’s going to burst.  Prices can’t stay at these levels, interest rates are going to 
rise for the first time in five years and I think it will be significant.” She warns that 
investors are “in for a big shock at some stage”… She said house prices in Ireland are 16-
17 times the average income, compared to nine-10 times in Italy, Germany and France. 
(The Irish Times, 24 November 2005, p. A4) 
But the author of the article, Edel Morgan, is unimpressed:  
While she might be proved right, she’s beginning to look like the girl who cried wolf.  
We’ve become jaded by an endless barrage of predictions about dips, bursts and crashes 
by economists and various institutions. So far, the doom and gloom merchants have got it 
wrong but it might be a mistake to become too complacent. (The Irish Times, 24 
November 2005, p. A4) 
The same sentiment can be found in another Irish Times article, written by Laura Slattery in 
February 2006.    
Irish banks have plenty of scope to increase their mortgage lending in a housing market 
that looks set to remain robust according to new research.  A report by Dr Brian Lucey, a 
lecturer in finance at Trinity College, says that mortgage lenders will be able to grow their 
business activity through high interest loans to people with poor credit records – known as 
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‘sub-prime’ mortgages – loans for investment properties, 100 per cent finance for first-time 
buyers and equity release loans.  The report, commissioned by mortgage servicing 
company Homeloan Management Limited HML), predicts that the favourable economic 
and demographic factors driving demand would continue.  Dr Lucey said that concerns that 
there may be a housing ‘bubble’ would prove unfounded and that there was little risk of a 
catastrophic fall in housing prices. This was because growth in house prices in recent years 
was not out of line with historic trends, he said (The Irish Times, 14 February 2006, p. 21). 
In November 2006, Marc Coleman wrote:  
Since the early 1990s, the Central Bank has been the boy who cried wolf, warning us about 
risks of a property bubble and a debt crisis.  When house prices slowed last year, the 
crowds decided to go home and the bank’s Financial Stability Report of that year 
concluded that there was no more market for the message.  In that report, the risk of a 
housing bubble was seen as having receded.  And if there was some overvaluation in the 
market, the Central Bank saw it as likely to be easily correctable.  This year, the bank has 
returned to form.  Its latest stability report, published yesterday, notes how the latest 
annualized rate of house price increase was 14.8 per cent, twice the rate of growth 
prevailing at the time of last year’s report. (The Irish Times, 9 November 2006, p. 21) 
His interpretation of the Central Bank’s report is that (a) housing affordability is not a 
problem because ‘affordablity now is the same as in the mid-1990s and the early 2000s’; (b) 
what has worsened in the housing sector is exposure to interest rate increases; (c) the banks 
are healthy in terms of solvency and liquidity; (d) the range of banking assets in Ireland ‘is 
too property centred’.   
In October 2007, the Irish Times published a head-to-head debate between the UCD 
economist, Morgan Kelly and Austin Hughes, chief economist with IIB Bank, with Kelly 
arguing that a property crash was imminent and Hughes arguing that a ‘house price collapse 
will be avoided’. Interestingly, Kelly’s analysis was based on rather simple calculations with 
no recourse to sophisticated models or esoteric statistical techniques. Another economist, 
Alan Aherne, also used ‘simple arithmetic’ to predict that the Irish economy would fall into 
recession in 2008 (The Irish Times, 31 December 2007, p. 14).  Yet, even at this point, there 
wasn’t consensus that the bubble was bursting, with Danny McCoy, IBEC’s Director of 
Policy, taking the optimistic position in this particular head-to-head debate. 
This review of the media conversation about the Tiger shows that, even as late as 2008, there 
was little appetite for the type of analysis that was, not only sorely missing, but also of the 
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type that management academics might be expected to provide. 
 
The phenomenon of disinterest 
This paper has argued that the Celtic Tiger and its downfall has been a ‘phenomenon of 
disinterest’ for management academics.  The purpose of the paper is primarily to identify and 
initiate some analysis of the phenomenon of disinterest rather than reimagine what might be 
done differently in the future.  And, given that research is highly institutionalised, the 
likelihood is that past practices will continue into the future.  Here, we are reminded of 
Cotter’s (2011) final, pessimistic comment in his study of previous Irish banking failures: ‘It 
seems that little has been learned from the lessons of the past, a fact likely to be reflected in 
the future regulation of the banking sector.’ Yet, in terms of business research, there are 
indications that things might be done differently in the future and hence we will end with 
some commentary and speculation about this.  First, let us talk about money. 
The property driven collapse of the banking sector has cost the Irish state more than €60 
billion, and in this context the State and society can legitimately query the contribution of 
Irish academics, and business academics in particular.  There are no figures available for the 
number of business academics in Ireland, but in the UK there are roughly 16,000 academics 
in teaching and research (or research only) roles in business or social science departments 
(Williams 2013).  Ireland probably has a similar number of business and social science 
academics (per head of population) and the expectation is that these will be doing research at 
least two days per week.  Without doing the arithmetic, it is clear that the Irish state is 
spending a lot of money on business and social science research.  When the state is strapped 
for cash, it is likely that questions will be asked about the value of this investment and the 
contribution of business academics to important issues of concern to the State and its citizens.   
In this debate, business academics will probably, and quite rightly, point to the much bigger 
investment that the State has made in the natural (as against the social) sciences.  Moroever, 
the scale of the monies lost through the collapse of the banking sector would suggest that 
there was a general and significant deficit in understanding of social and organisational 
phenomena such as corporate governance, risk-taking, hubris, mimesis, greed and ethics, 
which suggests that there should be more rather than less investment in social scientific and 
business research. However, a likely response to this argument is that the amount of State 
investment is not the important issue, but how research is organised, funded and directed.  
Here, it is worth recalling that in the mid-twentieth century, when the Irish state was 
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developing its research policy, the decision was taken not to involve the universities because 
these were, at the time, perceived to have neither the capacity, ability nor critical mass to 
carry out quality social science research.  Instead, the Economic Research Institute, the 
Institute of Public Administration, the Irish Management Institute, and An Foras Forbartha 
were created to, respectively, research the Irish economy, the public sector, the private sector 
and the built environment.2 It is time and timely for the Irish State to reflect on the 
contribution of these agencies (and, latterly, the third level institutions), especially in light of 
the Tiger experience, and to re-evaluate how best to organise, direct, fund and incentivise 
business, economic and social science research.  In such a review, it would also be important 
to evaluate whether the ‘bidding’ (or ‘market’) model that the State has operated through the 
Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) is the appropriate 
way to fund research, and timely research in particular.   The Irish Academy of Management 
can provide an important role in such a debate. 
The education of researchers, especially PhD students, is another area that warrants analysis.  
It appears to me that research methodology courses, which are becoming embedded into 
structured PhD programmes, are working to create a focus on the techniques of doing 
research (because techniques can be taught) and shifting attention away from the merits of the 
research project itself.  In particular, researchers should be able to demonstrate that their 
research question is interesting, relevant (and, given that business is a game with winners and 
losers, relevant to more than just ‘managers’), and worthy of public funding. 
Finally, it is time for more of us to vacate the twin towers of business research that go under 
the names of positivism and interpretivism, and to build a new (or renewed) phronetic 
paradigm suited to the particular needs and nature of social inquiry (Kavanagh 2013).  In this 
project, the person who has done most to map out the new paradigm is Bent Flyvbjerg (2001; 
2004; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012) and so I will leave the last words to him.  For Flyvbjerg (2001: 
60), ‘the point of departure for classical phronetic research can be summarized by the 
following three value-rational questions: (1) Where are we going? (2) Is this desirable? (3) 
What should be done?’  If these questions had been more central to our conversations, we 
might, perhaps, have had different Tiger talk. 
 
                                                
2 The Economic Research Institute was subsequently expanded to include ‘society’ and was re-named the 
Economic and Social Research Institute in 1966, while An Foras Forbartha was closed in 1993 when the 
Environmental Protection Agency was created.  One can only speculate if there was any connection between the 
State closing the agency charged with researching the built environment and the subsequent property bubble. 
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